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This paper provides an eﬃciency explanation for regulation of sex, drugs and
gambling (the so-called “morality laws”). The argument is motivated by the
observation that the enforcement of these laws often promotes discretion. We
propose that morality laws can be best explained by considering the proscribed
activities to impose a negative externality on others when the activity is ob-
served. Eﬃciency requires discretion by the individual who engages in such
activities. When discretion is diﬃcult to regulate directly, the activities can
instead be proscribed thereby giving individuals incentive to hide their actions
from others. We ﬁnd conditions for the ﬁrst-best levels of consumption and
hiding to be implementable. In addition, since some level of activity is eﬃcient,
this paper provides another environment in which the optimal sanctions are
not maximal.
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mongrain@sfu.ca and pcurry@sfu.ca“What, then, is the rightful limit to the sovereignty of the individual over
himself? Where does the authority of society begin? How much of human
life should be assigned to individuality, and how much to society?”
– J.S. Mill, “On Liberty”, Chapter 4
1 Introduction
There are parts of each of our lives that we view as private. Other aspects of our
lives we view as public and subject to pressures of social responsibility and possibly
regulation. The distinction between private and public life plays a central role in
many political and philosophical debates. One point of view, often referred to as
“liberalism”, maintains that it is important for certain decisions that the individual
remain sovereign, i.e. that it belong to the private sphere. An example of this view is
presented in former Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau’s famous quote
that “the state has no business in the bedrooms of the nation”. While Trudeau meant
“in the bedrooms” in a ﬁgurative sense to indicate that he was talking about sexual
regulation, it was also meant in a very literal sense. A common formulation of the
libertarian view is that what consenting adults do in private is nobody’s business but
their own. This paper proposes that the linkage between private decisions and private
locations is evident in many social norms and regulations and that it stems from the
presence of negative externalities that are incurred when the activity is observed.
The idea that the observation of an activity could aﬀect another’s utility is central
to the analysis of this paper and worth expanding upon. For some externalities, one
might prefer the source to be visible. Consider the example of toxic waste. Such
waste may not be visible to the naked eye, and so if agents do not observe the act of
pollution, they may be unaware of its existence and thus expose themselves to undue
health risks. In this paper, we consider externalities that are exacerbated by visibility.
For example, an individual may not like knowing that prostitution occurs in his/her
neighborhood, but ﬁnds it more distasteful when it is overt. We use the term “psychic
externality” to refer to any situation in which the harm caused by an activity can be
1reduced through hiding behaviors. The other two cases (where visibility decreases or
has no eﬀect on the level of harm), we refer to as “real externalities”.
This paper is not the ﬁrst to propose that psychic externalities can be important in
explaining customs and regulations. With respect to morality laws, Rasmusen (1997)
argues that the law need not diﬀerentiate between real and psychic externalities. For
example, if person A is willing to pay person B to stop using drugs, and willing to pay
more than B needs to be willing to stop, then eﬃciency requires that B stop using
drugs. In the presence of transaction costs, regulation might be required to achieve
eﬃcient outcome. This is true whether the A’s willingness to pay stems from a real
or psychic externality. The problem becomes more complex, however, if we consider
the psychic externality to be inﬂuenced by the observability of the action. Consider
an example in which A is willing to pay B to not use drugs in A’s sight. Suppose
A is willing to pay $100 for B to stop using drugs altogether and $40 for B to stop
using drugs in A’s presence. If B needs at least $120 to be compensated for not using
drugs, and $30 to use drugs away from A, then eﬃciency requires that B use drugs,
but only out of A’s sight. Enforcement of discretion may be diﬃcult, however1. This
paper demonstrates that the ﬁrst-best (i.e. eﬃcient consumption and hiding) can be
implemented even when it is impossible to legislate on discretion directly. Speciﬁcally,
legislators can provide incentive for B to consume drugs discreetly by making drug
use illegal but with a low penalty. Using the above example, as long as detection by
the authorities is correlated with observation by others, B will be deterred from using
drugs in public, where the probability of getting caught is relatively high, but not
from doing them in private, which is eﬃcient.
We construct a model in which an agent, called the injurer, chooses the level
of consumption for a good which causes harm to another agent, called the victim.
This harm is assumed to be reduced by costly hiding behaviors. Transaction costs
1A law stipulating that drug consumption can only be done in private homes would be easy to
enforce. However, it may not necessarily be the appropriate discretion level. It may be that B
should be allowed to consume in some public places, as is often the case with alcohol. Similarly, it
may be that legalized consumption at home does not oﬀer enough discretion. It may be the case
that family members are precisely the ones who are aﬀected by the externality, and such legislation
would force them to be in harm’s way. We thank Ig Horstmann for this last insight.
2are assumed to prevent the injurer and the victim from eﬃcient bargaining. The
government chooses an enforcement eﬀort and a sanction for consuming the banned
good or activity. In addition of reducing the harm to the victim, hiding also reduces
the probability of detection.
When externalities are real, hiding by criminals is a socially wasteful allocation
of resources. Malik (1990) shows that when criminals can invest eﬀort in hiding
their crimes, maximal sanctions may be sub-optimal. Higher sanctions increase the
incentive to hide, which is welfare reducing. In our case, some amount of hiding can
be welfare enhancing. If hiding cannot be legislated directly, an injurer chooses to
hide her consumption only if it is illegal. As a result, the government bans the good,
even though the eﬃcient level of consumption is positive, but chooses sanctions and
enforcement such that the injurer still consumes a positive amount and engages in
socially beneﬁcial hiding. Our model predicts that optimal ﬁnes are not maximal,
and that it is eﬃcient for crime to be committed even though it may be costless to
deter it.2
Becker, Grossman and Murphy (2003) consider a social planner that does not
value drug consumption purely according to the utility of the agents in society. In
particular, the planner values utility derived from drug consumption less than other
forms of utility. We oﬀer a model in which welfare is based purely on agents’ utilities
and yet regulation of drug use is optimal. Boylan (2004) considers the political
economy of drug legislation. He notes that drug oﬀenses represent a larger proportion
of prosecutions at the federal level than they do at the state level. The explanation
oﬀered is that drug use imposes a negative externality at a national level. As a result,
prosecution at a federal level is welfare improving. For Boylan, it does not matter
whether the externality is real or psychic. Finally, Miron and Zwiebel (1995) argue
that, while drug use is associated with increased violence and crime, it is actually
prohibition that is the cause, not consumption. This point is also raised by Pires
(2002). While we do not formally consider externalities caused by prohibition, their
argument is relevant to this paper and will be discussed in greater detail in the
following section and in the conclusion.
2For papers on sub-maximal sanctions see Andreoni (1991), Kaplow (1990), Malik (1990), Polin-
sky and Shavell (1984) or Shavell (1991).
31.1 Stylized Facts about Morality Laws
Arguments in favor of morality laws often claim that such activities can have delete-
rious eﬀects for not only the individual committing the act(s) in question, but also
others. Thaler and Sunstein (2003) propose that if agents are not fully aware of
the consequences of their actions, then the provision of such information is generally
preferred to restrictions.3 We assume that choices made by an agent are perfectly
aligned with the maximization of his or her true welfare, so no form of paternalistic
interventions are needed.
The presence of an externality, however, could certainly allow for legislation. In-
deed, examples of real externalities have been put forward in order to explain these
laws: prostitution leads to increased spread of sexually transmitted disease; drug use
leads to an increase in accidents and, potentially, crime. While we would not dispute
the existence of such externalities and others, regulations used to deter those type of
activities often do little to reduce any real externalities and may in fact exacerbate
them. Consider the argument that sexually activity should be regulated to decrease
the spread of sexually transmitted diseases. Making prostitution illegal can reduce
the exchange of services. However, driving prostitution underground may have the
eﬀect of increasing the practice of unsafe sex, by reducing the prostitute’s ability to
require that her customers wear condoms, or by making regular checkups more costly,
leading to a net increase in sexually transmitted diseases. In general, it seems unlikely
that banning prostitution would be more eﬀective at reducing STDs than legalizing
it and imposing regulations surrounding the practice of safe sex.
Posner (1992) notes that the arguments for laws against drugs based on real
externalities are often unconvincing. He argues that the fact that drug use leads to
crime is primarily due to the monopoly pricing of drugs that stems from the illegality
of the drugs. Legalizing drugs increases competition, leading to lower prices, and less
crime. Miron and Zwiebel (1995) present strong evidence that current legislation does
little to reduce such externalities associated with drugs. For example, they compare
modern rates of addiction to drugs such as opium, heroin and cocaine to rates before
1914, when such drugs were legal. They note that, before prohibition, addiction was
3As long as the provision of such information is not too costly.
4quite rare and that society did not seem to suﬀer from high crime rates as a result
of prevalent drug use. They argue that creating an illegal market for drugs lowers
the marginal cost of violent crimes while increasing the marginal beneﬁts. When the
sale of drugs is illegal, individuals do not have legal recourse to enforce contracts and
property rights, thus the beneﬁts to violence increase.
If hiding is eﬃcient, however, then there should exist a body of legislation that
makes only the public aspect of an activity illegal. Indeed, there exist many such
laws. Alcohol is legal in all Western countries, but is subject to many restrictions.
While these restrictions vary somewhat from country to country, they all entail keep-
ing consumption of alcohol to speciﬁc areas and preventing public drunkenness. In
addition, in Canada and much of Western Europe, prostitution is legal, but solici-
tation is not4. In other words, it is legal to exchange money for sexual favors, it is
just not legal to discuss it in public5. In addition, brothels, or “bawdy houses”, are
illegal in Canada, Italy, Luxembourg, the UK and parts of Spain. Where they are
not illegal, brothels are often relegated to “red-light districts”, as in the Netherlands,
Germany and Belgium. As such, anyone wishing to engage in prostitution must do
so discreetly.
Another prediction of the model is that when the harm is greater (i.e. there are
either more victims, or the victims are harmed to a greater degree), eﬃciency would
require less consumption and more hiding. In countries where the puritan ethic is
stronger, therefore, we should expect to see more prohibition, as well as stronger
penalties. Canada and Western Europe have less regulation on sexual activity than
4In Europe, only Ireland and Sweden prohibit prostitution. European countries that allow prosti-
tution but not solicitation (sometimes written as legal as long as it “does not disturb public order”)
include the UK, Germany, Belgium, Finland, France, and Italy. A summary of the various prosti-
tution laws in Europe can be found in Galiana (2000).
5The Canadian Criminal Code states that “every person who in a public place or in any place
open to public view (a) stops or attempts to stop any motor vehicle, (b) impedes the free ﬂow of
pedestrian or vehicular traﬃc or ingress to or egress from premises adjacent to that place, or (c) stops
or attempts to stop any person or in any manner communicates or attempts to communicate with any
person for the purpose of engaging in prostitution or of obtaining the sexual services of a prostitute
is guilty of an oﬀense punishable on summary conviction”. This particular part of the Canadian
Criminal Code can be found at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en/C-46/267334.html#rid-267359.
5the US, which would be consistent with this hypothesis. With regards to drugs,
the United States has the strongest penalties; in 2002 the median sentence for drug
possession in the US was 12 months6 while in the United Kingdom in 1998, the
average sentence for drug possession was 3.4 months7, and in Canada over the years
1999 and 2000, the average sentence was 50 days8. Recall that our paper suggests
that illegal consumption is optimal, and these penalties do not seem to deter use to a
great degree. An estimated 5.7 million Americans used cocaine in 2000 and in 1990,
Americans consumed $69.9 billion (US), or 447 metric tons worth of cocaine (Oﬃce of
National Drug Control Policy (2003)). In Britain, an estimated 10% of adults under
35 have tried cocaine (BBC News report, Nov. 25, 2005). The Alcohol and Other
Drugs Survey of 1994 found that 23% of Canadians had tried marijuana and that
in 2000 there were an estimated 2 million Canadians who smoked marijuana in the
previous 12 months (Senate Canada (2002)). Easton (2004) estimates that there may
be as many as 17,500 “grow-ops” currently in British Columbia.9
An interesting example of an increase in harm occurred during the WWI era.
While drunkenness (or even just a hangover) on the job is always detrimental to pro-
ductivity, the harm is magniﬁed when a country is in the midst of a war eﬀort. While
this type of harm may not seem psychic in nature, note that it is reduced by hiding.
That is, as long as an individual does not let their alcohol consumption aﬀect their
work (part of an individual’s public life), it does not matter how much one consumes
in their leisure time. In 1917, it was determined in the United States that people
were not taking proper care to prevent the eﬀects of their enjoyment of alcohol from
spilling over into their workday. As such, the production and sale of alcohol became
illegal. In 1920, the 18th amendment made prohibition permanent10. It is worth
noting prohibition actually had very little eﬀect on the amount of alcohol consumed,
although it did have the desired eﬀect on production (see Thornton (1991)).
6See Pastore and Maguire (2005).
7See Corkery (2000).
8Taken from Statistics Canada (2001).
9Easton also notes that penalties for running a grow-op are very low. In Vancouver, 55% of
grow-op “busts” led to no jail time and only 13% received jail time greater than 90 days. Further,
only 35% of cases led to a ﬁne, and the average ﬁne meted out was a paltry C$1,200.
10See Miron and Zweibel (1995) and Thornton (1991).
6The following section outlines the model and the results. Section 3 concludes and
discusses some issues not addressed by the model. All proofs are in the appendix.
2 The Model
2.1 The Environment
We consider a simple economy with two agents and a government. The ﬁrst agent,
who we call the injurer, I, derives utility from the consumption of a single good or
activity. Denote the injurer’s consumption by θ, and let B (θ) be the beneﬁt derived
from consumption, where B (·) is continuous, diﬀerentiable, strictly concave, and
B0 (0) > 0. We also normalize B(0) to be 0 for notational simplicity later on. The
injurer can also choose to hide her consumption. Let h denote the level of hiding,
which has a per-unit cost of 1 so that the injurer’s utility from consumption θ and
hiding h is given by UI (θ,h) = B (θ) − h. The second agent we call the victim, V .
The victim suﬀers some disutility from the injurer’s consumption. This disutility is
reduced by the injurer’s hiding. Denote the harm incurred by the continuous and
diﬀerentiable function C (θ,h), where Cθ (θ,h) > 0 and Ch (θ,h) ≤ 0, with the last
condition satisﬁed with inequality when θ > 0. Note that the victim does not make
any decisions in this simple model. It is assumed that transaction costs are such that
bargaining cannot take place.
2.2 Eﬃciency
In the absence of transaction costs, the injurer and victim would be able to bargain to
maximize the sum of the injurer’s and the victim’s utilities. That is, the eﬃcient levels




B (θ) − C (θ,h) − h
Suppose that a solution exists, i.e. that the ﬁrst-best levels of consumption and
hiding are ﬁnite. Denote these eﬃcient levels by θo and ho, respectively. Assuming
7that B0(0) > Cθ(0,h) and that −Ch(θ,0) > 1, both θo and ho are positive. This social
optimum is characterized by the system of equations
B
0 (θ





o) = 1 (2.2)
Figure 1 depicts the eﬃcient levels of consumption and hiding. It should be noted
that it is possible for the eﬃcient level of hiding to be zero. For example, this occurs
when hiding does not aﬀect the harm incurred by victim. Such cases correspond
to the traditional environment of externalities and regulation. In addition, if the









Figure 1: On the left, the marginal beneﬁt of consumption is equal to the marginal
cost, given the eﬃcient level of hiding. On the right, the marginal beneﬁt of hiding,
given the eﬃcient level of consumption, is equal to the per unit cost of one.
The following section considers how a central planner could promote eﬃciency
when it has the instruments of the courts available to it.
2.3 The Government’s Problem
The government is assumed to maximize the sum of agents’ utilities derived from
the injurer’s consumption less enforcement costs. It should be noted that the set of
8instruments available to the government could vary depending on the particular good
or activity being regulated. In particular, the government may or may not be able
to regulate hiding behavior directly. If the government is able to regulate hiding,
then the optimal policy would be to set a quota equal to θo and to require that the
injurer choose ho. This would be accompanied by minimal enforcement and penalties
for deviating from θo and ho suﬃciently high to ensure that the injurer complies. As
noted above, examples of such regulation on hiding behavior can be readily found.
Regulation on hiding behavior may not always be possible, as mentioned above.
Furthermore, quotas on consumption may also be diﬃcult to enforce. In this case, the
government is limited to choosing enforcement, the penalty and amount of monitoring,
for consumption only. If the injurer decides to consume the good, she will be ﬁned
with some probability. The probability that illegal consumption is detected is given
by p(e,h), where e is the enforcement eﬀort chosen by the government. The larger
the eﬀort by the government, the larger is the probability of being detected, pe(·) > 0.
The cost of enforcement eﬀort is given by κ(e) where κ0 (e) > 0 and κ00 (e) ≥ 0. It is
also assumed that κ0 (0) = 0. The injurer’s hiding behavior decreases the probability
of being caught, ph(·) < 0. Finally, we assume that there exists a small chance that
the injurer is caught even if the government does not expend any enforcement eﬀort.
That is, we assume p(0,h) > 0, ∀h11.
An injurer who is caught consuming the banned good receives a sanction S (θ). It
is assumed that these sanctions can be collected without cost. As such, any sanction
levied acts as a transfer between individuals and does not appear in the government’s
objective function. The government’s maximization problem is given by
max
e,S(θ)
B (θ) − C (θ,h) − h − κ(e)
In order to examine the government’s optimal policy, it is necessary to examine
how the injurer’s decisions of θ and h depend on (e,S (θ)). We begin by considering
sanction schedules that are continuous and diﬀerentiable. Of course, the government
is not restricted to such schedules. As will be seen below, however, we ﬁnd conditions
11This assumption has no bearing on the results. Without this assumption, attention would be
restricted to suprema of the government’s objective function as opposed to maxima.
9for such sanction schedules to be optimal. We then consider optimal sanctions that
are discontinuous, as it turns out that they are easier to analyze when the ﬁrst best
is not implementable. The following section examines the behavior of the injurer.
2.4 The Injurer’s Behavior
Given a governmental policy, (e,S (θ)), the injurer can decide to commit crime (choose
θ > 0), or comply with the law. If the injurer does not consume the good, her utility
is given by
U
I = B (0) − h = −h
If the injurer chooses to consume the good, then her (expected) utility is given by
U
I = B(θ) − p(e,h)S (θ) − h
First, note that when the injurer complies with the law, her utility is strictly
decreasing in h. Thus one possible solution to the injurer’s maximization problem is
given by θ = 0 and h = 0. We shall refer to this solution as compliance. Another
possible solution is for the injurer to choose θ > 0. An injurer who decides to consume
a positive amount of the good θ, also chooses an optimal hiding eﬀort h∗(θ). This
optimal hiding eﬀort is characterized by the following ﬁrst order condition:12
−ph (e,h
∗)S (θ
∗) = 1 (2.3)
The injurer chooses the level of hiding to equalize the marginal reduction in the
expected sanction with its marginal cost of one. The higher the sanction is, the
more hiding is chosen. This implies that if the sanction is an increasing function of
consumption θ, higher consumption is coupled with higher hiding. In other words,
consumption and hiding decision are complements. The injurer also chooses how
much to consume. If we consider hiding to be a function of consumption, the optimal
12For the second order condition to be satisﬁed, it requires that the marginal beneﬁt of hiding be
decreasing (−phh (·) < 0), which we assume. Note that this implies a unique solution for h∗(θ).







Equation 2.4 states that when the injurer chooses her level of consumption, she equal-
izes the marginal beneﬁt of consumption with its marginal cost, which is given by the
probability of being detected times the marginal sanction.
Let θ∗ and h∗ denote this solution, depicted in Figure 2. For simplicity, it is
assumed that in the case that the injurer is indiﬀerent between committing crime










Figure 2: On the left, we show the injurer’s optimal choice of consumption, given h∗.
On the right, we show the injurer’s optimal choice of hiding, given θ∗.
We now consider the government’s optimal policy, given the injurer’s behavior as
described above.
13The second order condition requires that B00(θ)−P(·)S00(θ)−Ph(e,h∗(θ))
∂h
∗(θ)
∂θ < 0). In general,
as long as the marginal beneﬁt of consumption decreases fast enough this condition will be satisﬁed.
However, if hiding is very productive (−Ph(·) is very large); inﬁnite consumption could be coupled
with very high hiding. Note that sanctions that increase at an increasing rate, S00 (θ) > 0, help ensure
that the second order conditions will be satisﬁed. This is consistent with penalties for possession
of large amounts of drugs being signiﬁcantly higher than for small amounts. Again, we assume the
second order condition is satisﬁed and so a unique solution for θ∗ is guaranteed.
112.5 Optimal Policy
It may seem at ﬁrst that the government has as many instruments as the injurer
has choice variables (two), and that one of these instruments, monitoring eﬀort, is
costly. In general, the government would not able to implement the ﬁrst best in such
situations. However, the sanction aﬀects the injurer’s behavior both through the
level, S (θ), and the rate of increase, S0 (θ). Thus the government actually has three
instruments available to it, one of which is costly. As such, the ﬁrst best is in fact
implementable without cost. The government chooses monitoring to be equal to zero,
so that no costs are incurred, the level of the sanction is chosen so that the marginal
beneﬁt to hiding is equal to its marginal cost of one, and the rate of increase of the
sanction is chosen so that the marginal expected penalty is equal to the marginal
harm. The only condition that may prevent the ﬁrst best from being implemented is
that the level of the sanction must be such that the injurer chooses to commit crime
as opposed to complying. This is demonstrated formally in the following theorem.
Result 1: If the government chooses e = 0, S (θo) = 1
−ph(0,ho) and S0 (θo) =
B0(θo)
p(0,ho) >
0, the ﬁrst best is implementable if and only if B(θo) ≥ p(0,ho)S(θo).
Figure 3 depicts the implementation of the ﬁrst best. The government uses S (θ)
and S0 (θ) to emulate the marginal social costs at the eﬃcient levels of consumption
and hiding. This leads the injurer to internalize the costs imposed on the victim.
Speciﬁcally, S0 (θ) is set such that the marginal expected penalty to illegal consump-
tion is equal to the marginal cost to the victim at the eﬃcient level. At the same
time, S (θ) is set so that the marginal beneﬁt of hiding to the injurer is equal to the
marginal beneﬁt of hiding to the victim, again at the eﬃcient level.
An interesting corollary to this theorem is that the optimal sanction is not max-
imal. Since the solution involves the injurer choosing to commit crime, the sanction
S (θo) has to be set to a ﬁnite value even though it is costless. It is also worth com-
menting on the assumption that victims do not make any decisions. If there exist
parts of a city in which activities such as prostitution or drug use are permitted, then
eﬃciency may require eﬀort from the victim to avoid such areas. This would explain
why, for example, pay-per-view channels that show explicit adult ﬁlms are not part of












Figure 3: On the left, the injurer chooses the eﬃcient level of consumption, given ho.
On the right, the injurer chooses the eﬃcient level of hiding, given θo.
that people who don’t like the programming of these channels shouldn’t order them.
Victim precaution can create a problem for tort law, as the solution often entails
conditional negligence rules or the doctrine of “coming to the nuisance”. The reason
it is problematic for torts is that victims have incentive to take less than eﬃcient level
of precaution because they receive damages. For criminal charges, however, victims
do not receive any compensation. As such, it is privately optimal for victims to take
the eﬃcient level of precaution when the injurer hides eﬃciently14. Thus we do not
need to modify our model in order to incorporate the idea of victim precaution.
At this point, it should also be noted that there exist discontinuous sanction




−ph(0,ho) θ ≤ θo
∞ θ > θo
Such a sanction schedule would also lead the injurer to choose θo and ho. Note
that the arbitrarily high penalty above θo (which acts as a threshold), leads the
injurer to choose the eﬃcient level of consumption, while the level of the sanction
at the threshold, call it S∗, is what leads the injurer to choose the eﬃcient level of
14This is because the only social beneﬁt to victim precaution is the victim’s private beneﬁt in the
reduction in harm.
13hiding. With such a sanction schedule, the government’s two costless instruments
are the threshold and the level of the sanction at (and also below) the threshold.
Since the penalty is prohibitively high above the schedule, the government is in eﬀect
choosing the injurer’s consumption and the penalty paid (which sets the hiding). The
remainder of the analysis considers the use of such a sanction schedule.
Recall that Result 1 requires that the injurer prefer to consume and hide at the
eﬃcient levels than comply. Suppose that this were not the case. That is, suppose
that the sanction that would induce the injurer to consume and hide at the eﬃcient
levels is such that 0 > B (θo) − p(0,ho)S∗. In this case, the government must drop
the sanction so that the injurer chooses to consume the illegal good. However, if
S∗ decreases, the injurer would reduce her hiding as the marginal beneﬁt to hiding
becomes too low.
Also recall that hiding and consumption are complements for the injurer. Thus
if the government were to increase the threshold above θo, then the injurer would
increase both consumption and hiding. The government could thus tradeoﬀ social
costs arising from too much consumption with costs from too little hiding. In addition,
if monitoring on behalf of the government increases the marginal beneﬁt to hiding,
i.e. peh (·) < 0, then the government could also tradeoﬀ the costs of insuﬃcient hiding
with enforcement costs. The following result formalizes the above intuitions.
Result 2: When B(θo) <
p(0,ho)
−ph(0,ho), the government will tradeoﬀ social costs of ex-
cessive consumption with costs of too little hiding. In addition, the government will
monitor with e > 0 if and only if phe (·) < 0.
The above model does not consider diﬀerential enforcement of the law. That is,
the above model assumes no discretion by authorities when it comes to making arrests
or where to monitor. If police have such discretion, then this model suggests that
police would enforce the law in such a way as to keep the activity less conspicuous in
parts in which there are relatively more people that are oﬀended, or “injured”, by the
activity. In particular, the police might allow these activities to take place as long
as there are no complaints. This also suggests that, when it is possible to regulate
hiding behavior directly, this legislation would often take things like location into
consideration. For example, the activity could be legal with a license, but licenses
14are restricted to certain parts of town.
3 Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that the existing body of laws surrounding sex, drugs and
gambling can be eﬃciency promoting. As noted by Rasmusen (1997), if these ac-
tivities impose a negative externality on others, then there exists the potential for
welfare improvements through regulation. This paper demonstrates that if this ex-
ternality is diminished through costly hiding by the injurer, then the socially optimal
legislation closely resembles what we observe. In particular, we observe a large body
of legislation directed at the public aspect of these activities. This paper does not
presume to have considered all the factors behind such laws, however. In particular,
it does not consider the problems caused by prohibition as suggested by Miron and
Zwiebel (1995). However, it is worth mentioning that when governments do legislate
on the visibility of an activity rather than the activity itself, many of these problems
are lessened. For example, individuals would have legal recourse if a transaction did
not go as advertised. Many of these problems may also be solved if quotas are imple-
mented. Whether this is the case is, to a large extent, an empirical issue and further
research in this area would be helpful.
If externalities stemming from prohibition are not an issue, and regulating the
public aspect is diﬃcult, then granting discretion to law enforcers can also be bene-
ﬁcial. For example, we observe that the enforcement of such activities often depends
on the conspicuousness of the activity and the number of people in the area that
might be bothered by it. For example, police often do not make any attempts to shut
down brothels or grow-ops until they receive a suﬃcient number of complaints from
people in the area. If the police could enforce the law in such a way as to keep the
activity less conspicuous in parts in which there are relatively more people that are
oﬀended, or “injured”, by the activity, then this would be equivalent to an increase
in hiding.
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Proof to Result 1:
If the government chooses the policy e = 0, S (θo) = 1
−ph(0,ho) and S0 (θo) =
B0(θo)
p(0,ho) and
the injurer chooses to commit crime, her optimal choice is θ = θo and h = ho. This
can be seen as follows. Recall that the injurer chooses θ and h to solve equations 2.4











The ﬁrst equation yields S0 (θo) =
B0(θo)
p(0,ho). The second equation yields S (θo) =
1
−ph(0,ho). Note that in order for the injurer to choose to commit crime, it must
be that B (θo) − p(0,ho)S (θo) ≥ 0.
Since the injurer is choosing the eﬃcient levels of consumption and hiding and the
government is not incurring any costs, this must be the optimal policy. 
Proof to Result 2:
Recall the government’s maximization problem. Using a sanction schedule that sets
an arbitrarily high penalty above a threshold level, the government in eﬀect chooses
θ, S∗ (the penalty associated with consuming θ, which aﬀects h), and e (which also
aﬀects h) to maximize the sum of utilities. In order to get the injurer to commit
crime, however, there exists a constraint that B (θ) ≥ p(e,h)S∗ − h. If we write
the injurer’s choice of hiding as h∗, to denote that it is a function of S∗ and e, the
maximization problem is given by
max
θ,S∗,e
B (θ) − C (θ,h
∗) − h




The necessary ﬁrst order conditions for the government’s problem are therefore
[B
0 (θ) − Cθ (θ,h











0 (e) − λpe (e,h
∗)S
∗ ≤ 0 (4.3)
where the inequality in 4.3 holds with equality if the optimal monitoring eﬀort is
positive.
16When the government uses such a sanction schedule, the injurer’s ﬁrst order con-
dition for hiding is
−ph (e,h
∗)S
∗ − 1 = 0











∂e > 0 if and only if peh < 0, which states that government monitoring
increases the marginal return to hiding.
Returning to the ﬁrst order conditions, we see from 4.1 that when the constraint
does not bind, then λ = 0 and it is optimal to choose the eﬃcient level of hiding.
When the constraint does bind, however, λ > 0 and so the optimal policy must entail
[B0 (θ) − Cθ (θ,h∗)] < 0, which occurs when consumption is greater than the eﬃcient
level. Examining 4.2, we see that when the constraint does not bind, the eﬃcient level
of hiding is implementable, but when λ > 0, the optimum has [−Ch (θ,h∗) − 1] ∂h∗
∂S∗ >
0. Since ∂h∗
∂S∗ > 0, it must be that [−Ch (θ,h∗) − 1] > 0, which occurs with hiding less
than the eﬃcient level. Finally, when the constraint binds, the government will use
monitoring only when ∂h∗
∂e > 0, which occurs when peh (·) < 0. 
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